



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Policy Planning

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1987 11 25

November 25, 1986

U.S. S-1

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Secretary:

Read this and weep. Our
"moderates" were respectively
a known fabricator, a semi-literate
terrorist, and



NOV 25 1986
J.C.W.
has seen

17

Michael H. Armacost

11/24

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

#124

EXHIBIT
GPS-47

Biographic Summaries of Iranian Principals Involved
in NSC's Iranian Program.

The three primary Iranian contacts with whom the NSC has
been in contact since 1975 are Manuchehr GHORBANIFAR [redacted]
[redacted] Attached are biographic
summaries of what we know about the three individuals.

Ghorbanifar, the NSC's principal intermediary, is well
known to us and is the subject of a "Burn Notice" based on our
assessment that he is an intelligence fabricator. The
Department of State was one of the original recipients of that
"Burn Notice" and recently was given another copy of that memo.

Ghorbanifar is a particularly complex individual and we have
found it difficult in dealing with him to separate fact from
fiction. The "Burn Notice", giving our negative assessment of
his intelligence potential, is a result of the considerable
fiction surrounding his information. However, to give him his
due, there is considerable fact surrounding the wide circle of
influential contacts Ghorbanifar claims. It is this latter
aspect of Ghorbanifar which interested the NSC. He was, in
fact, a useful, if somewhat uncontrollable, intermediary.

[redacted] an Iranian official in the Prime Minister's
Office, was Ghorbanifar's primary Iranian government contact.
That little we know of him we have learned from Ghorbanifar and
from direct contacts with [redacted] himself.

[redacted] became
the primary NSC channel to the Iranian government in September
1980, after progress through the Ghorbanifar [redacted] channel
ground to a halt. We had never heard of [redacted] before the
NSC came up with his name through other Iranians with whom they
were in contact. Everything we know about [redacted] has been
obtained from direct contacts with him and the other Iranians
in contact with the NSC.

5/4/87

WORKING COPY
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASS BY _____
DECL _____
DERIVED FROM _____

SECRET

BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY ON MANUCHENR GHORBANIFAR

Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, aka Jalilfar Suzani, Manuel Pereira, Nicholas Nikols, was allegedly born in Tehran 9 May 1943. However, he has also said he was born in Isfahan and has used birth dates of 1944, 1945, and 1938. He is an Iranian citizen currently using London as a business address, though he maintains a residence on the French Riviera in Nice. He calls himself an "export-import businessman" and has had a close business relationship with Adnan Khashoggi, the Saudi financier.

Ghorbanifar has served in the Iranian army and claims to have worked for OXANA. He was once Managing Director of the Israeli-connected Star Line Shipping Company. He is a self-proclaimed "chameleon" and admits to contacts with US, [REDACTED], Israeli, [REDACTED], and Iranian intelligence services. He has a [REDACTED] passport in the name of [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] passport in the name of [REDACTED], an Iranian passport in the name of Jalilfar Suzani, and claims to have an [REDACTED] passport in an Arab name as well.

Prior to the fall of the Shah, Ghorbanifar claimed to have access to many senior military and government officials, as well as good contacts in the Iranian underworld. In late 1979, he was a member of the Tehran Komite. However, he and his two brothers were implicated in an abortive coup in July 1980 and this resulted in a curtailment of his travel to Iran. Since that time he has operated out of Europe. He has remained in close contact with various Iranian exile groups in Europe, but has also said he has reported on these groups to the present Tehran regime.

Ghorbanifar has been active in the arms procurement business on behalf of the Iranian regime since the revolution. In 1984, he volunteered information about terrorist activities against U.S. persons. However, polygraph exams by both CIA and the Secret Service indicated that he had fabricated his information. As a result of these deceptions, this Agency published an intel fabricator "burn notice" on him.

In 1985, [REDACTED] stated that Ghorbanifar was one of his most influential contacts and that Ghorbanifar was an "Iranian intelligence official" interested in negotiating a settlement of the hostage issue.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCE
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CL BY _____
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DERIVED FROM _____

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of Iranian
 [REDACTED] is a high school education and
 is presently taking university correspondence courses. He
 speaks no English.

[REDACTED] has
 considerable combat experience.
 [REDACTED]

5/6/87

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTAINS NO
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
 AND METHODS INFORMATION

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 SECRET

CL BY _____
 DECL _____
 DERIVED FROM _____

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United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

November 23, 1986

SECRET

Mr. Secretary:

Read this and weep. Our
"moderates" were respectively
a known fabricator, a semi-literate
terrorist, and [excised]
[excised]
[excised]

Michael H. Armacost

SUBJECT: Biographic Summaries of Iranian Principals Involved
in NSC's Iranian Program.

The three primary Iranian contacts with whom the NSC has been in contact since 1985 are Manuchehr GHORBANIFAR [excised] [excised] Attached are biographic summaries of what we know about the three individuals.

Ghorbanifar, the NSC's principal intermediary, is well known to us and is the subject of a "Burn Notice" based on our assessment that he is an intelligence fabricator. The Department of State was one of the original recipients of that "Burn Notice" and recently was given another copy of that memo.

Ghorbanifar is an incredibly complex individual and we have found it difficult in dealing with him to separate fact from fiction. The "Burn Notice", giving our negative assessment of his intelligence potential, is a result of the considerable fiction surrounding his information. However, to give him his due, there is considerable fact surrounding the wide circle of influential contacts Ghorbanifar claims. It is this latter aspect of Ghorbanifar which interested the NSC. He was, in fact, a useful, if somewhat uncontrollable, intermediary.

[Kangarlou], an Iranian official in the Prime Minister's Office, was Ghorbanifar's primary Iranian Government contact. What little we know of him we have learned from Ghorbanifar and from direct contacts with [Kangarlou] himself.

[excised] became the primary NSC channel to the Iranian government in September 1986, after progress through the Ghorbanifar [excised] channel ground to a halt. We had never heard of [excised] before the NSC came up with his name through other Iranians with whom they were in contact. Everything we known about [excised] has been obtained from direct contacts with him and the other Iranians in contact with the NSC.

SUBJECT: Biographic Summary on Manuchehr GHORBANIFAR

Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, aka Ga'far Suzani, Manuel Pereira, Nikolous Kralis, was probably born in Tehran 9 May 1945. However, he has also said he was born in Isfahan and has used birth dates of 1944, 1940, and 1938. He is an Iranian citizen currently using London as a business address, though he maintains a residence on the French Riviera in Nice. He calls himself an "export/import businessman" and has had a close relationship with Adnan Khashoggi, the Saudi financier.

Ghorbanifar has served in the Iranian army and claims to have worked for SAVAK. He was once Managing Director of the Israeli-connected Star Line Shipping Company. He is a self proclaimed "wheeler-dealer" and admits to contacts with US, [excised], Israeli, [?] and Iranian intelligence services. He has a [?] passport in the name of [excised], an Iranian passport in the name of Ga'far Suzani, and claims to have an [excised] passport in an Arab name as well.

Prior to the fall of the Shah, Ghorbanifar claimed to have access to many senior military and government officials, as well as good contacts in the Iranian underworld. In late 1979, he was a member of the Tehran komiteh. However, he and his two brothers were implicated in an abortive coup in July 1980 and this resulted in a curtailment of his travel to Iran. Since that time he has operated out of Europe. He has remained in close contact with various Iranian exile groups in Europe, but has also said he has reported on these groups to the present Tehran regime.

Ghorbanifar has been active in the arms procurement business on behalf of the Iranian regime since the revolution. In 1984, he volunteered information about terrorist activities against U.S. persons. However, polygraph exams by both CIA and the Secret Service indicated that he had fabricated his information. As a result of these deceptions, this Agency published an intel fabricator "burn notice" on him.

In 1985, [excised]
[excised] stated that Ghorbanifar was one of his most influential contacts and that Ghorbanifar was an "Iranian intelligence official" interested in negotiating a settlement of the hostage issue.

SUBJECT: Biographic Summary on [excised]

[excised]
[excised] He apparently was born in Tehran and comes from a very humble background. During the reign of the Shah, [excised] in the Tehran bazaar. He has very little education and has been described as semi-literate. He speaks no English.

[excised]
[excised]
[excised] Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, the Iranian businessman operating in Europe, said he was involved in an arms procurement deal in March 1984 with [excised]

[excised]

SUBJECT: Biographic Summary on [excised]

[excised]
[excised] He is [excised] of Iranian
Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani. [excised]
[excised] has a high school education and
is presently taking University correspondence courses. He
speaks no English.

[excised] has
considerable combat experience. [excised]

[excised]

5/6/87'